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Abstract Automated negotiation has been used in a variety of distrib-
uted settings, such as privacy in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices and
power distribution in Smart Grids. The most common protocol under
which these agents negotiate is the Alternating Offers Protocol (AOP).
Under this protocol, agents cannot express any additional information
to each other besides a counter offer. This can lead to unnecessarily
long negotiations when, for example, negotiations are impossible, risk-
ing to waste bandwidth that is a precious resource at the edge of the
network. While alternative protocols exist which alleviate this problem,
these solutions are too complex for low power devices, such as IoT sensors
operating at the edge of the network. To improve this bottleneck, we
introduce an extension to AOP called Alternating Constrained Offers
Protocol (ACOP), in which agents can also express constraints to each
other. This allows agents to both search the possibility space more effi-
ciently and recognise impossible situations sooner. We empirically show
that agents using ACOP can significantly reduce the number of messages
a negotiation takes, independently of the strategy agents choose. In par-
ticular, we show our method significantly reduces the number of messages
when an agreement is not possible. Furthermore, when an agreement is
possible it reaches this agreement sooner with no negative effect on the
utility.
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1 Introduction
Autonomous agents, in particular those at the edge of the network—near to the
source of the data like single or cooperative sensors—often need to coordinate
actions to achieve a shared goal: for instance, they might need to negotiate either
access to local data to learn a shared model; or access to a shared resource like
bandwidth; or joint actions for complex activities such as patrolling an area
against wildfires (cf. Section 2).
Automated negotiation can provide a solution, by allowing agents to reach
a mutual consensus on what should and what should not be shared. However,
the standard method of negotiation under the Alternating Offers Protocol (AOP,
Section 3) [1] can be resource intensive and in particular bandwidth intensive due
to the number of messages that need to be exchanged before an outcome can be
determined. This might be particularly wasteful when considering autonomous
agents at the edge of the network, which have limited bandwidth resources. At
the same time, because such agents are often deployed on low-power devices,
they cannot be equipped with extremely complex reasoning capabilities able to
learn and predict other agents’ behaviour.
In Section 4 we present a novel extension of AOP called Alternating Con-
strained Offers Protocol (ACOP), that provides a suitable trade-off between reas-
oning capabilities and bandwidth usage, allowing agents to express constraints
on any possible solution along with the proposals they generate. This allows
agents to search more effectively for proposals that have a higher probability of
being accepted by the adversary. To measure the impact of this on the length
and outcomes of negotiations, we perform empirical analysis on a dataset of sim-
ulated negotiations (Section 5). To summarise, in this work we will address the
following questions:
Q1 Do negotiations operating under ACOP exchange fewer messages than ne-
gotiations operating under AOP in similar scenarios?
Q2 Does adopting ACOP negatively impact the outcome of negotiations when
compared to negotiations using AOP?
Results summarised in Section 6 provide evidence that negotiations operating
under ACOP require substantially fewer messages than negotiations operating
under AOP, without negatively affecting the utility of the outcome.
2 Context and Motivating Examples
Automated negotiation [5] is a wide field: while our focus is much narrower,
it encompasses a substantial number of application domains such as but not
limited to, resource allocation, traffic flow direction, e-commerce, and directing
Unmanned Vehicles (UxVs) [20,13,21]. As mentioned before, the most commonly
used protocol for automated negotiation, AOP, can require large amounts of mes-
sages to be communicated before an outcome can be determined. While more
sophisticated methods that alleviate communication bottlenecks by using, for
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example, fully-fledged constraint satisfaction solvers [6] exist, these can include
very complex reasoning that is not appropriate for agents deployed on low-power
devices that operate at the edge of a network. Additionally, many of these solu-
tions require a neutral third party to act as a mediator, which is not always
possible in distributed or adversarial settings. Below we will explore three ex-
amples to illustrate some of these applications.
Firstly, autonomous agents can share the burden of learning a model. Fed-
erated Learning is a machine learning setting where the goal is to train a high-
quality model with training data distributed over a large number of agents, each
possibly with unreliable and relatively slow network connections [12] and with
constraints such as limited battery power. For instance, in [17] the authors in-
troduce an incentive mechanism using auction-like strategies to negotiate with
bidding in a format similar to [18].
A second domain concerns the negotiation of wireless spectrum allocation
[18,9]. For instance, due to the low cost of IP-based cameras, wireless surveillance
sensor networks are now able to monitor large areas. These networks thus require
frequency channels to be assigned in a clever way: to this end, in [9] the authors
propose to use a text mediation protocol [11].
Consider now our third case, that involves a fully distributed and autonomous
surveillance system such as using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to patrol
an area at high risk of wildfires. Each UAV is fully autonomous and equipped
with processing capability for analysing their sensor streams and detect early
signs of wildfire. The uplink to the command control centre is via a slow and
unreliable satellite connection. However, each UAV is aware of the existence of
other UAVs via low-bandwidth wireless connections. Each UAV has access to
commercial-grade GPS. All UAVs are programmed to jointly cover a given area,
and have access to high-quality maps of the area which includes detailed level
curves. For simplicity, let us assume that the area is divided into sectors, and
each UAV announces the sector where it is, and the sector where it intends to
proceed.
Each UAV begins its mission randomly choosing a direction, and hence the
next sector it will visit. Its main goal is to preserve its own integrity—after all
it is worth several hundreds thousands dollars—while collaborating towards the
achievement of the shared goal. It is therefore allowed to return to base, even if
this will entail that the shared goal will not be achieved. Examples of this include,
when its battery cell level is too low, when adverse weather conditions affect the
efficiency of the UAV rotors, or when it has been damaged by in-flight collision
or some other unpredictable situation. In the case two UAVs announce that
they are moving towards the same sector, a negotiation between them needs to
take place in order to achieve coverage of the sector, while avoiding unnecessary
report duplication.
Let us suppose UAV1 receives an update that UAV2 can visit sector Sierra,
the same sector it was also aiming at. It can then send a negotiation offer to
UAV2 asking to be responsible for Sierra. UAV2 most likely will at first reply
that it should take care of Sierra, while UAV1 can take care of the nearby Tango:
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after all, it announced it first, it is already en route, and it needs to protect its
own integrity. Let us suppose that UAV1 knows that with its current power
level and/or performance of its 18 rotors, it cannot visit sector Tango as it
would require a substantial lifting. It would then be useful for it to communicate
such a constraint, so to shorten the negotiation phase and proceed towards an
agreement (or a certification of a disagreement) in a short time frame. Indeed,
knowing of UAV1’s constraint, UAV2 can accept to visit Tango, or maybe not,
due to other constraints. In the latter case, UAV1 can then quickly proceed to
search for other sectors to visit, or, alternatively, to return to base.
This last example illustrates potential uses of being able to communicate
constraints to other agents. In the next section we will set up the necessary
theory to discuss our proposed solution.
3 Background in Alternating Offers Protocol
Firstly we will give a brief overview of the basic negotiation theory used in this
work. Here all negotiations are assumed to be bilateral, meaning between only
two agents, referred to as A and B respectively. The negotiation space, which
is denoted Ω, represents the space of allowable proposals. This consists of the
product of several sets called issues, each containing a finite number of elements
called values. So, to reiterate, when we write Ω =
∏N
i=0 Λi with |Λi| = Mi that
means that the negotiation consists of N issues consisting of Mi values. In the
case that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} : Λi = Λj we may also write Ω = ΛN . Each agent
is also assumed to have a utility function uA, uB : Ω → R which each induce a
total preorder A and B on Ω via the following relation
∀ω, ζ ∈ Ω : ω A ζ ⇐⇒ uA(ω) ≥ uA(ζ)
and analogous for B, allowing the agents to decide whether they prefer one
proposal to another, vice versa or are indifferent towards them. Each agent also
has a reservation value ρA, ρB respectively, which is the minimum utility an offer
must have to an agent to be acceptable. A utility function u is called linearly
additive when the following identity holds:
∀ω ∈ Ω : u(ω) =
n∑
i=1
wiei(ωi) (1)
Here
∑N
i=0 wi = 1 and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : wi ∈ [0, 1]. Here the wi represents the
relative importance of the ith issue. This makes explicit that the assignment of
any issue does not influence the utility of any of the other issues.
The way in which the agents communicate is detailed by the protocol. This
is a technical specification of the modes of communication and what types of
communication are allowed. The most commonly used protocol is called the Al-
ternating Offers Protocol (AOP). In this protocol, the agents have only three
options: make a proposal, accept the previous proposal or terminate the interac-
tion without coming to an agreement. Here we use ωt to denote the offer made
at time-step t. Note that t is discrete.
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Finally, agents explore the negotiation space according to their strategy. Two
well known examples, known as zero intelligence and concession [3]. The zero
intelligence strategy is also referred to as a random sampling strategy. Agents
using a random sampling strategy generate offers by simply defining a uniform
distribution over the values of each issue, and constructs offers by sampling from
those distributions until they find one that is acceptable to them. Agents using
a concession strategy might just simply enumerate the offers in the negotiation
space in descending order of preference, either until the other accepts or until
they are unable to find offers that they find acceptable. We will use these two
strategies in our empirical analysis below. Both these strategies are well known
in the literature [14,2,19,7,4,16,8]. Zero Intelligence agents are often used as
a baseline for benchmarks and concession strategies in various forms are well
studied [3]. We therefore use them here as a proof of concept.
4 Our Proposal: Alternating Constrained Offers Protocol
Almost any negotiation is subject to certain constraints. For example, a good
faith agent will never be able to agree to sell something they do not have. When
constraints are incompatible, this can dramatically increase the length of the
negotiation, since under AOP there is no way to communicate boundaries of
acceptable offers. In an effort to alleviate this problem, without introducing
too much complexity, we propose an extension of AOP called Alternating Con-
strained Offers Protocol (ACOP). Using this protocol agents have the opportun-
ity to express a constraint to the opponent when they propose a counter offer.
This constraint makes evident that any proposal not satisfying this constraint
will be rejected apriori.
In this way, agents can express more information to the opponent about
which part of the negotiation space would be useful to explore without having to
reveal too much information about their utility function. This can even present
some strategic options. Cooperative agents could express all their constraints
as fast as possible to give the opponent more information to come up with
efficient proposals. On the other hand, more conservative agents can express
constraints only as they become relevant, which might lead to expose fewer
information in the case the negotiation terminates with an agreement before
exposing red lines. In this work we focus on the use of atomic constraints. These
are constraints that express which one of single particular issue value assignments
is unacceptable. These constraints can either be given to the agent apriori, or
they can be deduced by the agent themselves. Especially in the discrete case
with linear utility functions, a simple branch and bound search algorithm can
be enough to deduce where certain constraints can be created, which we illustrate
with the following example.
Example 1. Let A,B both be negotiation agents having the reservation value 13
and linear additive utility functions uA, uB respectively, using uniform import-
ance weights. Furthermore, let Ω = Λ3 with Λ = {v1, . . . , v6}. Therefore we have
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3 issues, with 6 values each. In this setup we can represent uA and uB as matrices
which are depicted in Figure 1, with the rows representing the issues and the
columns possible values. For example the offer ω = (v1, v1, v1) would have 0
utility for A and thus be unacceptable but utility 1 for B and be acceptable.
Due to the scale of the potential losses A can deduce using branch and bound
that ω2 = v2 can never be part of a solution they could accept. Therefore they
can record this constraint, and express this to B according to their strategy. An
example of a negotiation under ACOP of this scenario can be seen in Figure 2.
(a) A’s utility matrix (b) B’s utility matrix
Figure 1. Utility matrices for A and B respectively for example 1
This kind of reasoning is simple enough that it could be evaluated in response
to new information, such as an opponent ruling out a crucial option during
a negotiation. These constraints can help agents find acceptable options more
efficiently, but are also useful to help agents terminate faster by letting them
realise that a negotiation has no chance of succeeding. For example, when each
possible value of a particular issue is ruled out by at least one of the participants,
agreement is impossible and the agents can terminate early.
5 Experimental methodology
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that ACOP improves over AOP in
terms of negotiation length and does not negatively impact utility. We simulated
a variety of negotiations with randomly generated problems and agents using
either a random sampling or concession strategy as defined earlier, both under
AOP and ACOP. At the end of a simulation we recorded metrics such as length
of the negotiation and the outcome. In this section we will first detail how the
problems were generated and how the simulations were run. Then we will discuss
the results in more detail in the next section.
5.1 Problem generation
To run a simulation of a negotiation, four things are required:
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A
ω0 = (v6, v6, v6)
B
ub
(
ω0
)
= 0
ω1 = (v2, v2, v2)
ua
(
ω1
)
= −33 1
3
ω2 = (v5, v5, v5)
ω2 6= v2
ub
(
ω2
)
= 0
ω3 = (v2, v5, v2)
ua
(
ω3
)
= 1
3
ACCEPT
(
ω3
)
Figure 2. A schematic representation of an example negotiation under ACOP in the
setting set out in Example 1 assuming both agents use uniform weights
1. A negotiation space.
2. The utility functions for the two agents.
3. The reservation value for both agents.
4. The strategy and protocol the agents will use (in this case they are always
equal for both agents).
To make the results easier to compare, the negotiation space remained con-
stant, consisting of 5 issues each with 5 values across all negotiations. The utility
function and the reservation value determine which part of the negotiation space
is acceptable to which of the agents, whereas an agent’s strategy determines how
they explore the possibility space. We refer to an offer which is acceptable to
both participants of a negotiation as a solution to that negotiation. Furthermore
we call a negotiation possible if there exists at least one solution, and otherwise
impossible. We use configuration to refer to a pair of utility functions and a pair
of reservation values. A pair of utility functions is referred to as a scenario. Note
that for any configuration, the number of solutions can be calculated to any
outside observer with perfect information, since this is deterministic given the
parameters. In total 261, 225 configurations were generated, for each of which
4 negotiations were simulated, each corresponding to one of the strategy and
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protocol pairs. This means that in total 1, 044, 900 negotiations were simulated
and for each of them the length of the negotiation and the utility the agents
achieved at the end were recorded.
Initially 300 unique pairs of utility functions were generated by drawing from
uniform distributions on either {0, 1, . . . , 100} or {0, 1, . . . , 25}. The scenarios
were drawn from two possible distributions to ensure that both sufficient im-
possible and possible configurations would be tested. Whether there are many,
if any, mutually agreeable options in a configuration can be quite sensitive to
randomness in the utility functions, and the reservation values the agents adopt,
especially when the utility functions have a wide range. For each of the 300 base
scenarios, several variants were created by adding an equal number of constraints
in both utility functions, up to a maximum of 12 per agent. Note that if we were
to create a constraint in a value assignment where the opponent has very low
utility, the constraint is unlikely to make a difference, since the opponent is not
likely to make an offer that violates that constraint, meaning that the additional
information doesn’t get utilised. To avoid this problem we applied what we call
constraint injection. This means that if we want to introduce n constraints in
the utility function of agent A, we do this by determining the n most favourable
assignments for B and overwrite the utilities for those assignments in A’s utility
function with a value that is low enough to create a constraint. If A has a max-
imum utility of umaxA then a value lower than −umaxA is enough to ensure a
constraint will be created. In this scenario, the theoretical best utility possible is
100. Therefore we used −1000 as our constraint value, to avoid potential bound-
ary issues. An example of a generated scenario sampled from [0, 100] before and
after injecting 1 constraint in each utility function can be seen in Figure 3.
(a) Scenario as originally generated (b) Scenario after injecting 1 constraint in
each utility function. Note that the colour
of the constrained cells is not to scale to pre-
serve differentiability of the other colours
Figure 3. Examples of generated utility matrices before and after injecting 1 constraint
We express reservation values as a percentage of the agent’s maximum pos-
sible utility: an agent with a reservation value of 12 will only accept offers
that have at least half the utility of the best possible outcome. Firstly let
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Rlin =
{
1
2 +
i
20 |i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9}
}
, i.e. 10 points spaced equally apart on [ 12 , 1].
Furthermore let Rlog =
{
10log10(
1
2 )−
i log10(
1
2
)
10 |i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9}
}
, i.e. 10 points in
[ 12 , 1] such that they are equally spaced in log-space. Pairs of reservation values
were taken from either (Rlin)
2 or (Rlog)
2. Again, taking pairs from these two
sets was to ensure that enough possible and impossible configurations would be
explored.
5.2 Running the simulations
We introduced the two strategies used in this work—random sampling and
concession—and how they work under AOP back in Section 3. We will now
first explain how the agents adapt these strategies to function under ACOP.
The constraint-aware version of the random sampling agent will adjust the
distribution it samples from, when a new constraint is introduced so that any
assignment that has been ruled out is given probability 0. Since base random
sampling agents construct offers by independently sampling from the possible
values for each issue, an agents using ACOP can simply assign probability 0 to
the values that were ruled out, and renormalise the distribution.
The concession agent explores the negotiation space using breadth-first search
with the utility function as a heuristic. When the constraint aware version of this
agent receives a constraint, they adjust their utility function, but overwriting the
utility of the value that is being ruled out by a value that is smaller than negative
their best utility. This ensures that all offers not satisfying it will fall below the
reservation value, ensuring that they will never generate an offer that violates a
known constraint.
To summarise, for each of the configurations generated, as discussed in the
last section, 4 simulations were run, corresponding to one of the following strategy
and protocol pairs:
1. Random sampling using AOP.
2. Concession using AOP.
3. Random sampling using ACOP.
4. Concession using ACOP.
To ensure that the negotiations would terminate, even if the configuration
was impossible, a timeout of 400 rounds was introduced, meaning that each agent
is allowed to make at most 200 offers. After this number of offers, agents would
simply terminate the negotiation without reaching an agreement. In addition,
the random sampling agent also terminates if it cannot discover an offer that
is acceptable to themselves after 1000 samples, and the concession agent would
terminate as soon as it cannot find new offers that have a utility above the
reservation value. We chose these values as they were deemed to provide generous
upper bounds for agents on the edge of a network. At the end of the negotiation
three variables were collected:
1. Whether the negotiation was successful.
10 S. Vente et. al.
2. How many messages were exchanged during the entire negotiation.
3. The utility achieved at the end of the negotiation by both agents.
Here the utility achieved by each of the agents was equal to the utility of the
offer that was accepted or 0 if no agreement was reached.
6 Results
6.1 Impact of adopting ACOP on negotiation length
In this section, we study the impact that changing protocols, i.e., using con-
straints, has on negotiation length, keeping everything else fixed. Figure 4 plots
for each strategy the frequency of different negotiation lengths, in a logarithmic
scale.
(a) Distribution of the length of the negotiations using concession
(b) Distribution of the length of the negotiations using random
Figure 4. A distribution plot of the length of all the negotiations simulated. Note the
logarithmic scale.
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This shows that ACOP requires substantially fewer messages than AOP on
average, evidenced by the fact that much more of the mass of the ACOP bars
is concentrated near the left in both graphs. It is worth noting that the peak at
the right of the graphs is mostly due to impossible negotiations. This solidifies
the idea that no matter the ‘difficulty’ of a negotiation, ACOP will on average
terminate faster than AOP. We will investigate whether this means that ACOP
achieves lower outcomes than AOP in the next section.
We can get a more detailed understanding of the impact of using ACOP
compared to AOP by looking at the box-plot in Figure 5. This figure depicts the
number of messages saved by using ACOP instead of AOP in an identical con-
figuration. Here we have broken down the data by two categories: The strategy
used, and whether the configuration had a solution or not.
For the agents using a random strategy, by far the most gains were made in
the impossible configurations. Note that there are some configurations for which
ACOP performed worse than AOP, as evidenced by the lower whisker. However,
this is due to the randomness of the bidding. In these cases, the agents using
AOP were simply unable to find an offer they found acceptable themselves, and
thus terminated, while the constraints allowed the agents using ACOP to find
proposals that were acceptable to themselves and thus kept negotiating. However
we can deduce from the box plot that this is actually a relatively rare case. Even
in cases where ACOP did not save a large number of messages, it almost never
prolonged the negotiation by much if at all.
For concession agents, ACOP saved more messages when the configurations
did have a solution, meaning that ACOP allowed the concession agents to search
the negotiation space much more effectively. In the case where the configurations
were impossible, ACOP still decreased the number of messages used even if
fewer messages were saved. This is due to the fact that a lot of the impossible
negotiations still have large sets of offers that are acceptable to just one of the
agents that have to be ruled out. When considering all simulations run, we see
that ACOP saves an average of 75 messages and with a median of 8 messages
saved. Considering that the distribution of negotiation lengths is heavily skewed
towards the lower end, we consider this to be a very favourable result. With
these observations we conclude that ACOP performs at least as well as AOP
and improves upon AOP substantially in the majority of cases when considering
the length of a negotiation.
6.2 Impact of adopting ACOP on competitive advantage
Before analysing the outcome of a negotiation in terms of utility two key obser-
vations need to be made. First of all, these results are highly dependent on the
range of the utility functions. Secondly, the cost that agents incur by ending a
negotiation without agreement can have a big impact on the results. The impact
of having different non-agreement costs or very different utility functions is out-
side of the scope of this work. Therefore the agents in this work did not receive
an additional penalty for failing to reach an agreement (i.e., a non-agreement was
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Figure 5. A box plot detailing the messages saved by using ACOP compared to AOP
with identical configurations.
given utility 0 for both agents) and they were all given similar utility functions
as discussed previously.
Here we will investigate whether adopting ACOP negatively impacts the
outcome of identical negotiations in which agents use AOP. To this end we
compared the utility of the negotiations using ACOP to that of the negotiations
of the same configuration but using AOP. In Table 1 a per-strategy-breakdown
can be seen of what percentage of the negotiations using ACOP had a much
better, better, equal, worse or much worse outcome than negotiations of equal
configurations using AOP. If ACOP has a higher utility, the configuration was
classified as better. If ACOP had a utility of at least 10 higher (10% of the
theoretical maximum utility) it was classified as much better, with worse and
much worse being defined similarly in the other direction.
In this table, we can see that for the concession agent, the vast majority
of negotiations using ACOP (81.68%) had the exact same utility at the end as
a negotiation of an identical configuration using AOP. While there were some
cases in which ACOP performed slower, this happened in only roughly 3% of all
cases, and in only 0.55% was the difference in utility bigger than 10. Conversely,
in about 15% of the cases ACOP achieved a higher utility at the end of a ne-
gotiation, and in roughly 9% did it gain more than 10 utility above what AOP
achieved.
Looking at the percentages for the random agent, we see that while there
are more negotiations where ACOP achieves a lower utility than AOP. This
was to be expected, since agents will immediately accept any offer from the ad-
versary they find acceptable. Furthermore, we can see that the frequencies are
symmetrically distributed, meaning there are roughly equal numbers of config-
urations that achieved a higher utility using ACOP as there are configurations
that achieved a lower utility using ACOP. This pattern can be easily explained
by the randomness of the bidding of the agents.
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Percentage of total
Strategy ACOP compared to AOP
Concession Much better 9.06
Better 5.88
Equal 81.68
Worse 2.82
Much worse 0.55
Random Much better 3.40
Better 27.83
Equal 38.44
Worse 27.62
Much worse 2.70
Table 1. Table detailing the percentages of configurations broken down by strategy
and how the utility of the outcome of ACOP compared to that of AOP. Configurations
for which the difference in utility was greater than 10 would be classified as either much
better (if ACOP did better), or much worse (if AOP did better)
With all of these observations, we conclude that using ACOP does not neg-
atively affect the outcome of the negotiations in any systematic way.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a novel extension to the Alternating Offers Protocol
(AOP) called Alternating Constrained Offers Protocol (ACOP) which allows
agents to express constraints to the adversary along with offering counter pro-
posals. These constraints can be given to an agent apriori, or discovered using
branch-and-bound algorithms. This protocol allows agents—especially agents de-
ployed on low-power devices at the edge of a network—to terminate negotiations
faster without consistently negatively impacting the utility of the outcome, al-
lowing them to save bandwidth without the need to equip them with sophistic-
ated reasoning capabilities. We explored the impact that this extension has on
the length of the negotiations as well as on the utility achieved at the end of
the negotiation. We empirically showed that this extension substantially reduces
the number of messages agents have to exchange during a negotiation. When
agreement is possible, using ACOP helps agents to come to an agreement faster,
and when agreement is impossible, agents using ACOP terminate much faster
than agents using AOP both when agents adopt a probabilistic or a determin-
istic search method. In addition, we showed that using ACOP has no systematic
negative impact on the quality of the outcome in terms of utility when compared
to the same strategies using AOP.
While the results of this work were promising, the scenarios and strategies
used to produce them were not very complex. Future work will include invest-
igating the performance of ACOP under non-linear utility functions, and with
more sophisticated strategies and opponent models, comparing also with other
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approaches for dealing for instance with fuzzy constraints [15], and with also
much larger large, non-linear agreement spaces [10]. Another avenue will be to
understand the impact of using soft constraints rather than hard ones.
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